Operational Risk Management

      The rapidly advancing technology in the aviation field creates many challenges in maintaining a safe industry.  While the manned aviation requirements are strict, the unmanned requirements will be even stricter (once the requirements are set by the FAA).  Without the human presence on board, safety is completely reliant on the continuity of the electronics both on board the aircraft and with the operator.  One way to assess the risks associated with operating a UAV is to create an Operational Risk Management Assessment Tool.  While most hazard and risk analyses are generally used throughout all stages of a products’ life cycle; this paper will focus on the operational phase of a small commercial UAS, a DJI Phantom.

            In order to create an ORM Assessment Tool, a few steps must be taken in order to develop the tool.  The first step is a Preliminary Hazard List (PHL), a brainstorming tool used to identify initial safety issues early in the UAS operation (Barnhart, Hottman, Marshall, & Shappee, 2011).  This list is broken down into stages of the flight: planning, staging, launching, flight, and recovery (Barnhart, Hottman, Marshall, & Shappee, 2011).  Typically, each stage of flight has its own PHL sheet in order to reduce confusion.  Once the hazards for each stage are listed, one needs to determine the probability and severity of the hazard using the levels defined in MIL-STD-882D/E.  Per the MIL-STD-882D/E the levels of probability are: frequent, probable, occasional, remote, or improbable; and the levels of severity are: catastrophic, critical, marginal, or negligible (Barnhart, Hottman, Marshall, & Shappee, 2011).  Then the risk level needs to be determined.  This is usually done with a numeric value in order to obtain a sum of the values and get a total risk assessment number; when following the MIL-STD-882D/E the lower the number, the higher the risk.  Once the initial risk levels have been identified, an analysis needs to be done to find ways to mitigate the listed hazards (Barnhart, Hottman, Marshall, & Shappee, 2011).  In order to demonstrate this, an example of a PHL/A is given for the Staging stage (see figure 1). 

Figure 1 – Example of Preliminary Hazard List/Analysis

PRELIMINARY HAZARD LIST/ANALYSIS (PHL/A)
DATE:  17 Jul 2014		PREPARED BY:   Derek Iannuzzi			PAGE  2   OF   5
Operational Stage:         [ ] Planning          [X] Staging          [ ] Launch          [ ] Flight          [ ] Recovery
TRACK #	HAZARD	PROBABILITY	SEVERITY	RL	MITIGATING ACTION	RRL	NOTES
1	Nearby terrain features	Probable	Marginal	9	Change location or procedures	14
2	Nearby people	Occasional	Critical	6	Clear the area	22
3	GPS connectivity issues	Remote	Negligible	19	Change location to acquire more GPS satellites	20
4	Equipment calibration issues	Remote	Negligible	19	Calibrate UAS	24
5	Proximity to nearby airport	Improbable	Critical	15	Contact ATC	15
6	Potential for mid-air collision	Improbable	Catastrophic	12	Change flying procedures	12
7	Ability to maintain LOS	Remote	Marginal	14	Change GCS position	23
8	Improper "home" location	Remote	Negligible	19	Change location	24
RL = Risk Level, RRL = Residual Risk Level		Probability, Severity, and Risk Levels defined in MIL-STD-882D/E

Figure 1. An example of a Preliminary Hazard List/Analysis for sUAS operations in regards to a DJI Phantom during the Staging phase.  Adapted from: Barnhart, R., Hottman, S., Marshall, D., & Shappee, E. (2011). Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems. London: CRC Press. page 125.

            The next step is to develop an Operational Hazard Review and Analysis (OHR&A).  Just as the PHL/A tool is used to identify initial safety issues early in the UAS operation, the operational hazard review and analysis is used to identify and evaluate hazards throughout the entire operation and its stages (Barnhart, Hottman, Marshall, & Shappee, 2011).  While most of the hazards in the PHL/A will be redundant in the OHR&A, the latter is more geared towards the area of human factors.  In this assessment, the hazard column is replaced with an action review column.  This column will list if the identified mitigating actions implemented from the PHL/A was adequate (Barnhart, Hottman, Marshall, & Shappee, 2011).  An example of this analysis that continues from the previous PHL/A is demonstrated next (see figure 2).

Figure 2 – Example of Operational Hazard Review and Analysis

OPERATIONAL HAZARD REVIEW AND ANALYSIS (OHR&A)
DATE:  17 Jul 2014			PREPARED BY:   Derek Iannuzzi			PAGE  2   OF   5
Operational Stage:         [ ] Planning          [X] Staging          [ ] Launch          [ ] Flight          [ ] Recovery
TRACK #	ACTION REVIEW	PROBABILITY		SEVERITY	RL		MITIGATING ACTION	RRL	NOTES
1	Change location or procedures	Remote		Marginal	14		Review of new procedures	17
3	Change location to acquire more GPS satellites	Improbable		Negligible	20		Known "good" GPS acquisition locations	24
5	Contact ATC	Improbable		Critical	15		Move location away from airport proximity	22
6	Change flying procedures	Improbable		Catastrophic	12		Restrict flying to LOS	21
RL = Risk Level, RRL = Residual Risk Level		Probability, Severity, and Risk Levels defined in MIL-STD-882D/E

Figure 2. An example of a Operational Hazard Review and Analysis for sUAS operations in regards to a DJI Phantom during the Staging phase.  Adapted from: Barnhart, R., Hottman, S., Marshall, D., & Shappee, E. (2011). Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems. London: CRC Press. page 127.

            Finally, a Risk Assessment can be developed using the PHL/A and OHR&A worksheets.  The risk assessment provides the UAS operator with a quick look at the operation before committing to the flight activity; and it allows safety and management of real-time information needed to continually monitor the overall safety of the operation (Barnhart, Hottman, Marshall, & Shappee, 2011).  This assessment provides a quick check list in order to assess the risks associated with the operation in an easy to read form.  Unlike the previous assessment worksheets, this assessments numerical value is reversed; the lower the number, the lower the risk.  An example of a Risk Assessment for a sUAS operation of a DJI Phantom is given below (see figure 3).

Figure 3 – Example of a Risk Assessment Worksheet

sUAS Risk Assessment
Date: 17 Jul 2014		Aircraft: DJI Phantom			Serial #: 003
UAS Crew/Station:	_______________/____________           _______________/____________
	_______________/____________           _______________/____________
Mission Type	SUPPORT	TRAINING	PAYLOAD CHECK	EXPERIMENTAL
	1	2	3	4
Hardware Changes	NO			YES
	1			4
Software Changes/Calibration	NO			YES
	1			4
Airspace of Operation	WIDE OPEN	MINIMAL HAZ	MODERATE HAZ	ABUNDANT HAZ
	1	2	3	4
Operator Experience with this Aircraft	EXPERT	ADVANCED	INTERMEDIATE	NOVICE
	1	2	3	4
Flight Time	DAY			NIGHT
	1			4
Type of Flight	LOS	LOS/BLOS	BLOS	FPV
	1	2	3	4
Visibility	> 10 MILES	6-9 MILES	2-5 MILES	< 2 MILES
	1	2	3	4
Surface Winds		0-5 KTS	5-15 KTS	> 15 KTS
		2	3	4
Forecast Winds		0-5 KTS	5-15 KTS	> 15 KTS
		2	3	4
Weather Deteriorating	NO			YES
	1			4
Other Airspace Activity	NO			YES
	1			4
Established Lost Link Procedures	YES			NO
	1			NO FLIGHT
GPS Satellites Acquired	ALL 3	2	1	NONE
	1	2	3	4
Proper "home" Location Set	YES			NO
	1			4
Potential For Tx/Rx Interference	NONE	SOME	MODERATE	SEVERE
	1	2	NO FLIGHT	NO FLIGHT
Total
	RISK LEVEL
	18-27	28-36	37-45	45-56
	LOW	MEDIUM	SERIOUS	HIGH
Aircraft Number: __________________       Aircraft Type:  _______________________
Flight Released By:  _____________________________  Date: ____________  Time: ____________

Figure 3. An example of a Risk Assessment worksheet for sUAS operations in regards to a DJI Phantom.  Adapted from: Barnhart, R., Hottman, S., Marshall, D., & Shappee, E. (2011).Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems. London: CRC Press. page 128.

References

Barnhart, R., Hottman, S., Marshall, D., & Shappee, E. (2011). Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems. London: CRC Press.

Automatic Takeoff and Landing

        In the world of aviation there are manned and unmanned aircraft.  There is a certain level of automation that goes into each type of operation.  While most people assume unmanned aircraft fly mostly autonomously, it is not the case.  The opposite could be said for manned aircraft.  Both manned and unmanned aircraft utilize a certain level of automation as well as manual control.  There are advantages and drawbacks to each and in order to better understand them, further exploration into their systems is needed.  In regards to manned aircraft, the McDonnell Douglas MD-11 is a three-engine, medium to long range, wide body jet airliner that is capable of automatic takeoff and landing as well as being controlled manually by a pilot on board.  On the other hand, an unmanned aircraft with similar capabilities is Northrop Grumman’s RQ-4 Global Hawk; which is a High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) fixed wing aircraft powered by a single turbofan engine.

        The McDonnell Douglas MD-11 was designed off of the need to upgrade the fleet of DC-10’s (Brown, 2012).  In the 1970’s and 80’s, the DC-10 was overwhelmed with catastrophic failures; including American Airlines Flight 191, which resulted in 270 deaths (Brown, 2012).  Instead of inventing a new aircraft, McDonnell Douglas used new technological advances in order to develop a next generation aircraft with minimal effort.  The advanced cockpit design included: Fly-by-wire technology, CRT displays, dual flight management system computer, hydraulic fuses to prevent loss of control in catastrophic conditions, central fault display system, GPS, and CAT III automatic landing capability for extremely bad weather (Brown, 2012).  The improved dual flight management system eliminated the need for a flight engineer, reducing the required crew to two (Brown, 2012).  The system also performs automated normal, abnormal and emergency checklist duties for major systems, further reducing the need for additional crew members (Boeing, n.d.).
        The CAT III automatic landing capability is the main focus of the MD-11.  When it comes to automatic landing technology, there are three categories (I, II, and II).  Category I only go off of altimeter indications for decision height, the Category II and III approaches go off the radar altimeter for a decision height.  Automatic landing uses the radar altimeter to determine the aircraft’s height AGL to initiate the landing flare at the correct height.  The localizer signal of the ILS may be used for lateral control even after touchdown until the pilot disengages the autopilot.  Once automatic land is engaged and ILS signals acquired, the aircraft will proceed to land without further intervention, and can only be disengaged by completely disconnecting the autopilot.  This prevents accidental disengagement of the automatic land system at a critical moment.  Three independent autopilot systems work in harmony to provide redundancy against failures.  A pilot can override the system, however pilots have reported that the controls of the MD-11 are highly sensitive compared to other aircraft and the airplane’s autopilot was not disconnecting when they input manual controls (Brown, 2012).  This has led to some resistance from pilots.
        As for Northrop Grumman’s RQ-4 Global Hawk, the unmanned element of the aircraft requires operators to control the aircraft from Ground Control Stations.  The Global Hawk utilizes two completely different ground segments, a Mission Control Element (MCE) and a Launch and Recovery Element (LRE) (airforce-technology, n.d.).  The MCE is used for mission planning, C2, and image processing; while the LRE is used for controlling launch and recovery (airforce-technology, n.d.).  The LRE provides precision differential GPS system corrections for navigational accuracy during takeoff and landings, while precision coded GPS supplemented with an inertial navigation system is used during mission execution (airforce-technology, n.d.).  The technology allows the aircraft to “sense” when it’s aligned with the runway and when to engage its brakes when landing (Ciccarone, 2014).  While the autopilot allows the aircraft to take off and land in adverse weather conditions, human factors still play an important role.  In December 1999, a Global Hawk was damaged when it overran the runway due to operators setting an excessive taxi speed (Peck, 2003).
        Even though auto landing and takeoff is a beneficial technology that reduces the workload of pilots and allows flying in adverse weather conditions, human factors still remain an important role.  Only when correct planning and usage of the technology is combined with sound execution of the auto pilot system is when successful operations occur.  Redundancy in the technology is key, but even more important is proper training and procedures for the pilots/operators.

References

airforce-technology. (n.d.). RQ-4A/B Global Hawk HALE Reconnaissance UAV, United States of America. Retrieved July 13, 2014, from airforce-technology.com: http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/rq4-global-hawk-uav/
Boeing. (n.d.). Commercial Airplanes. Retrieved July 13, 2014, fromboeing.com: http://www.boeing.com/boeing/commercial/md-11family/
Brown, D. (2012, August 24). KLM Starts to Say Goodbye to the MD-11. Retrieved July 13, 2014, from airlinereporter.com: http://www.airlinereporter.com/2012/08/klm-prepares-to-say-good-bye-to-the-md11/
Ciccarone, P. (2014, June 12). RQ-4 Global Hawk makes first flight out of Misawa. Retrieved July 13, 2014, from misawa.af.mil:http://www.misawa.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123414268
Peck, M. (2003, May). Global Hawk Crashes: Who’s to Blame? . Retrieved July 13, 2014, from nationaldefensemagazine.org: http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2003/May/Pages/Global_Hawk3871.aspx

Shift Work Schedule

Shift Work Schedule

            In the current schedule four teams were given a six on two off schedule rotating shifts each work period.  Three eight hour shifts were separated into day, swing, and night; each overlapping by thirty minutes.  This schedule has many advantages and few disadvantages.  The consistent on duty time for six days in a row should allow the employee to become accustomed to the schedule.  Furthermore, the two days off are followed by a shift that starts later than the previous stint of working days, which should allow the worker additional time to adjust.  However, the six straight days of work can put a strain on the employee.  Changing shifts from day to swing to night can also increase fatigue since the body will just be getting used to one schedule when it’s time to change to another schedule. 

There are two approaches to scheduling, from a circadian perspective (ACEP, 2003).  One approach is to never rotate shifts (ACEP, 2003). Each person is different; some fare better at night, while others are more comfortable during the day.  If someone is willing to work strictly nights, the company should do what they can to retain them and appropriately compensate them.  The other strategy is to work as few a number of nights in a row as possible (ACEP, 2003).  The idea is to never reset your circadian rhythms, but to maintain a constant diurnal orientation.  The foremost benefit to working many night shifts in a row is that once adjusted to nights one will be alert, well rested, and provide optimal performance, rather than struggling to stay awake (ACEP, 2003).  The main way to determine which approach is best is to know the employees well and get feedback as to what they wish to have.  An employee scheduled for a shift time they want will be less likely to hate coming into work.

The other factor to take into consideration is the shift lengths.  One important finding about the internal "clock" is that it runs on a twenty-five hour day, not the expected twenty-four hour day (ACEP, 2003).  Subjects who are isolated and removed from all zeitgebers (various time clues of the exogenous component) will predictably go to bed an hour later each "day" and sleep an hour longer into the next day (ACEP, 2003).  Circadian principles are more easily applied to eight hour shifts.  However there are many advantages to twelve hour shifts.  With only two shift turnovers per day, the twelve hour shift schedule results in fewer opportunities for miscommunication and production disruptions that occur during shift changeover periods (CIRCADIAN, 2014).  Most workers need time to adapt to their work environment (i.e. adjusting monitors, organizing tools, etc.) and the twelve hour shift allows workers to maintain their productivity, while eight hour shifts may end while the worker is a full productivity (CIRCADIAN, 2014).  Twelve-hour shifts typically are more popular with both shift workers and their families, reducing stress and improving the quality of life at work and home (CIRCADIAN, 2014).  Lastly, shift workers tend to be more dedicated to their job.  On twelve hour workdays, employees are more likely to avoid major social events, excessive alcohol consumption or physically taxing activities in their fewer hours of free time (CIRCADIAN, 2014).

The revised work schedule is quite all over the place.  In addition to eight hour shifts, two twelve hour shifts were added.  The eight hour shifts will be on the weekdays and the twelve hour shifts will be on the weekends. This schedule allows employees to have more weekend days off at a time.  The schedule continues to shift from day to swing to night to continue with the extra time between changing shift days.  An advantage is short work weeks, consisting of three, four, and five days.  Employees get a whole weekend off every four weeks and two times per four weeks gets one weekend day off.  The main disadvantage is the one week that an employee will have to work three nights in a row, two of which are twelve hour shifts.  While the schedule seems a bit erratic, the short work periods give the operator’s time to catch up on rest.

References

ACEP. (2003, September). Circadian Rhythms and Shift Work. Retrieved from acep.org: http://www.acep.org/content.aspx?id=3056

CIRCADIAN. (2014, June 30). 8 Major Advantages of 12-Hour Shifts: A Manager’s Perspective (Part 1). Retrieved from circadian.com: http://www.circadian.com/blog/item/14-8-major-advantages-of-12-hour-shifts-a-manager%E2%80%99s-perspective.html#.U79Iyvl

UAS Beyond Line of Sight Operations

The ScanEagle is a fixed wing, long endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) developed by Insitu, a subsidiary of Boeing.  With a 3.1 meter wingspan, 1.4 meter length and a 20 kilogram mass, it utilizes a heavy fuel (JP-5 or JP-8) engine to fly at cruising speeds of 50-60 knots with a maximum speed of 80 knots (Insitu, 2013).  The ScanEagle has a flight endurance of over 24 hours and a flight ceiling of 5,950 meters (Insitu, 2013). 

The ScanEagle uses a command, control, and communications suite that allows the operator the ability to send and receive signals to the aircraft during Line-of-Sight (LOS) operations and Beyond-Line-of-Sight (BLOS) operations.  Typically LOS command and control (C2) data links use a C Band data link that uses low GHz frequencies for downlink, 3.7-4.2 GHz, and 5.9-6.4 for uplink (Oh, Piegl, & Valavanis, 2008).  C Band is strategically chosen for LOS C2 because the low GHz frequencies are less affected by extreme weather conditions (Oh, Piegl, & Valavanis, 2008).  However, the ScanEagle uses UHF for LOS command and control; and a Common Data Link (CDL) for BLOS operations.  CDL is a jam resistant spread spectrum digital microwave link only used by the military. 

ScanEagle’s Satellite-based communications (SATCOM) C2 platform used for BLOS operations utilizes a 900 MHz or 1.3 GHz L band frequency (Wilke, 2007).  Due to the remote applications of the ScanEagle, the C3 data link infrastructure is small and portable.  The long range antenna uses a 1.8 meter circular polarized dish with an effective range of 50-100 kilometers (Wilke, 2007).  These terminals also have the ability to link with one another allowing C3 capabilities to multiple UAVs simultaneously and the ability to pass off C3 capabilities from one GCS to another.  The L-band antenna on the UAV allows for direct analog video downlink to Insitu’s portable GCS (Rover III) or other remote video terminals.  The ScanEagle operation requires seven personnel: Analyst (1), Operators (3), Maintainers (2), and Mission Commander (1) (Wilke, 2007).

In regards to military operations, the advantage of BLOS operations is that it allows operators to be a great distance from the actual UAV; keeping the operator out of harms way and undetectable.  Two disadvantages of BLOS operations is that it is easier to encounter a lost link situation and operators have low situational awareness.  The unique operations of the ScanEagle is that the LOS operations are done autonomously and the BLOS operations are done manually; it’s typically the other way around.  This type of operation arises more human factor elements by the lower situational awareness of BLOS flight. 

            There are many potential commercial applications for BLOS UAV operations.  One in particular, is the application that Beyond Petroleum (BP) was just presented a Certificate of Authorization from the Federal Aviation Authority for and that’s the monitoring of oil pipelines in Alaska.  The extreme conditions and remoteness of the pipelines make a perfect prospective for BLOS operations.

References

Insitu. (2013). ScanEagle System. Retrieved from insitu.com: http://www.insitu.com/systems/scaneagle

Oh, P., Piegl, L., & Valavanis, K. (2008). Unmanned Aircraft Systems: International Symposium On Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. New York City: Springer.

Wilke, C. (2007, Feburary 28). ScanEagle Overview. Retrieved from csdy.umn.edu: http://www.csdy.umn.edu/acgsc/Meeting_99/SubcommitteeE/SEpubrlsSAE.PDF

UAS integration into the NAS

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has developed a roadmap in order to find a solution to the ever growing National Airspace System (NAS) safety issues.  The FAA's roadmap addresses policies, procedures, regulations, and technologies that will be needed in order for Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) to safely fly within the NAS.  The plan is to implement the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) system in stages between 2012 and 2025.  The goal of the NextGen system is to alleviate the stress and ensure the safety of the increased air traffic and introduction of UAS within the NAS.  According to the FAA's Destination 2025:

"NextGen is a series of inter-linked programs, systems, and policies that implement advanced technologies and capabilities to dramatically change the way the current aviation system is operated. NextGen is satellite-based and relies on a network to share information and digital communications so all users of the system are aware of other users' precise locations (FAA, 2013)."

The implementation of advanced sense and avoid technologies is the main focus on the manned aviation spectrum of the NextGen system.  For the NextGen system to work, all aircraft operating within the NAS will have to be able to effectively maintain a safe distance from each other, called self-separation.  As what is described as the backbone of the NextGen system, Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B), will move Air Traffic Control from radar based system to a satellite derived aircraft location system.  The requirement for ADS-B is planned to be implemented in the United States by January 1st, 2020 (Davidson, 2013).  ADS-B periodically broadcasts data such as, position, altitude, identification, and velocity about the aircraft through an onboard transmitter.  Other aircraft equipped with ADS-B and ATC will be able to see and interpret that data in order to maintain safe distances.

The difficulty that the FAA is facing with integrating UAS into the NAS is ensuring the UAS has the same level of safety that a manned aircraft has.  Without an actual pilot onboard, a UAS will have to utilize sensors in order to “see” objects in the sky.  The integration of ADS-B aboard a UAS will help with aircraft to aircraft position locations, but the ADS-B system does not sense other objects such as buildings, mountains, or trees.  Furthermore, the technology is too bulky and heavy to efficiently be installed in small UAS.  In order to match the safety of a manned aircraft, sense and avoid technology is going to have to be developed and successfully implemented into UAS before the FAA can approve the safety of the aircrafts.

The main human factor that is foreseeable in the future is the lack of training of UAS pilots.  Manned aircraft require extensive training not only to operate the aircraft safely, but to increase awareness of their surroundings.  As more people are getting into the hobby due to a large sUAS influx recently, the lack of skill in pilots is becoming even more apparent.  The public is seeing these sUAS as toys and not the dangerous aircraft that they are.  The FAA can mitigate this issue with a licensing program to fly UAS.  Different classifications can help in reducing the requirements to specifics of the aircraft (size, technology, distance, etc.).  There are already restrictions upon flying model aircraft, but they are loosely regulated and ignored all too often.  If pilots have to earn their right to fly while being taught safe practices, they will be less likely to break the rules and fly dangerously.


References

Davidson, J. (2013, September 23). ADS-B Requirements Coming Into Effect . Retrieved June 20, 2014, from universalweather.com:http://www.universalweather.com/blog/2013/09/ads-b-requirements-coming-into-effect/

FAA. (2013). Integration of Civil UAS in the NAS Roadmap. Retrieved June 20, 2014, from faa.gov: http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/uas/media/UAS_Roadmap2013.pdf

UAS GCS Human Factors Issue

I am going to focus on Aerovironment’s Ground Control Station (GCS) which is a common command and control solution for their family of small Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUAS) (Aerovironment, 2014).  The GCS (see Figure 1) is a compact, lightweight handheld piece of equipment designed for military use.  It is dustproof, waterproof and made of a high density plastic built for abuse.  It is designed for mobile use so the small size allows the operator to carry it within a backpack and it sets up in less than two minutes (Aerovironment, 2014).  The interoperability of the GCS allows the operator to use the GCS with the whole Aerovironment’s line of sUAS (Raven, Wasp, and Puma AE). 

Figure 1 – Aerovironment’s Ground Control Station

The GCS incorporates a small screen in order to see real-time video from the air vehicle’s payload cameras.  The GCS can also be embedded as a Remote Video Terminal (RVT), enabling Command Centers or Monitoring Stations the same viewing and analysis capability of the UAV operator (Aerovironment, 2014).  The GCS has the ability to store eighty image captures from the video feed (Aerovironment, 2014).  It allows for manually or autonomous flight operations and can store multiple pre-programmed missions (Aerovironment, 2014).  There are eight modes of operation (Manual, Altitude-Hold, Navigate, Loiter, Home, Loss-of-Link, Follow Me, Autoland).  It utilizes common military batteries which allows for easy integration into the battlefield.

Two human factors that I identified from its design is the exposed display screen and the compact size.  As evident with the smart phone revolution, people have a hard time keeping screens from breaking.  During military operations, the rough and quick handling of these units is just asking for the screen to get damaged.  During remote operations the damage could result in a failed operation unless a spare is present.  Another factor is the small screen.  While the compact size has many advantages in the battlefield, the small screen can put a strain on the operator’s eyes.  During long use, the operator could mistake non-hostiles as targets or make other bad decisions.  The ability to attach a larger screen, such as a “toughbook” would be an ideal solution to the problem.  As for the issue with the screen, a more expensive material to prevent easy destruction or a hard case could help mitigate the issue.

The issues that are present in the manned aviation community that relate to the factors of this GCS is eye strain.  During night operations or long duration missions, bright lights from either instruments or ambient lighting can accelerate fatigue and cause straining on the eyes. 

References

Aerovironment. (2014). UAS: Ground Control System. Retrieved from avinc.com: http://www.avinc.com/uas/small_uas/gcs/