Human Factors, Ethics and Morality

        The debate of the morality and ethics concerning the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in remote warfare is a heated one.  While the majority of the public perceives UAVs to be automatic killing machines, it is not the case.  The media portrays military UAVs in a negative light and tries to disassociate the UAV with the operator.  However, there is always an operator behind the controls of a UAV.  UAVs provide many benefits when utilized for military applications, such as: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; munitions delivery; and supply transportation to name a few.  The two main benefits are the ability to remove the pilot from the aircraft and to be able to control the aircraft from a distant location.

        The conversation about war is always going to have pros and cons.  Killing any one is wrong, no one will argue that; but if military action is morally justified, then accomplishing that task with the least amount of collateral damage possible is number one priority.  UAVs have the capability to collect accurate data, ensuring the Intel is correct about possible suspects.  It also allows the mission commanders a less stressful environment to make a conscious decision on if they should fire or not.  UAVs do not autonomously fire munitions at targets.  There are trained military personnel that make the decision and carry out the task, just like the troops do on the ground.  The effects of taking someone's life will weigh differently depending upon the individual, but it is safe to say that carrying out the order to kill a target from a UAV does not weigh any less on someone than if they were to kill a target from their rifle.

        When compared to manned aircraft, accomplishing the same objective can be carried out in a number of ways.  The main argument against the use of UAVs is that the pilot isn't there in person and has a hard time realizing the collateral damage of their actions.  However, it is evident that UAV ordinance delivery can be more accurate, thereby reducing collateral damage.  Furthermore, many manned military aircraft can use ordinance that can be deployed tens or even hundreds of miles away.  So how can one argue that manned aircraft pilots have a better understanding of their mission than a UAV operator?

        In the case of continuing the use of UAS in warfare, while the benefits of using UAVs greatly outweigh the cons, the moral and ethical concerns should be focused more on why we're at war in the first place.   Taking personnel and moving them to remote locations while still being able to accomplish their task is always going to be a step in the right direction.  As technology progresses, the quality of information will progress as well.  Having more accurate information and better suited ammunition will result in fewer civilian casualties and less collateral damage.

UAS Crew Member Selection

        As a hiring representative for a company whom plans to conduct oceanic environmental studies utilizing Unmanned Aerial Systems, one must consider many different variables when choosing the right personnel.  The company has purchased both the Insitu ScanEagle and a variant of the General Atomics Ikhana UAS in order to accomplish the required studies.  While both of these systems have similarities, they require different parameters in order to safely operate them.  In order to select and hire qualified personnel to fly and operate these aircraft, it is better to break down the operational requirements of the individual aircraft.

        In regards to Insitu’s ScanEagle, the aircraft has a few very distinct capabilities that define the requirements.  The ScanEagle uses a pneumatic launcher, called the “SuperWedge” and recovered by a hook on the end of the wingtip to catch a rope hanging from a 50 foot pole, called the “Skyhook” (Insitu, n.d.).  This technology allows the ScanEagle the ability to launch and land without a traditional runway, greatly reducing the footprint needed for operations; and allowing launch and recovery from a watercraft.  The ScanEagle uses many sensors, including ElectroOptic, MWIR, Analog and Digital video datalinks, and a command and control datalink (Insitu, n.d.).  Typical operations use two operators, one operator programs the aircrafts flight plan, while the other controls the payload (Pappalardo, 2007).  Insitu’s software called Distributed Information-Centralized Decision (DI-CD or “diced”) now allows a single operator to control multiple ScanEagles at once.  In June, a single operator controlled three aircraft simultaneously, taking the place of six people (Pappalardo, 2007).  He was able to do this because the aircraft were programmed to pick their own routes, divide up the terrain to be scanned, then find and follow targets without receiving any direct commands (Pappalardo, 2007).

        When looking at General Atomics Ikhana, the operational requirements are vastly different.  The Ikhana is almost six times the size of the ScanEagle and requires a runway for takeoff and landing.  Because of this, the maintenance requirements for the aircraft itself are more complex and abundant.  The Ikhana is able to carry an enormous amount of payload weight and has flight duration capabilities twice that of the ScanEagle (USAF, 2010).  However, the Ikhana utilizes the traditional operation crew of two, one for flying and one for payload sensors.  The Ikhana has the ability to switch over controls from one flight crew to another midflight (USAF, 2010).  This allows crews to have specific jobs; for example, a crew only takes off and lands, while another crew takes over the ISR responsibilities.

        Now that the capabilities of each aircraft are defined, the requirements for personnel to operate them need to be examined.  Since the majority of large UAS are operated by the military, there is no real set standard yet for civilians in the amount of training required.  The Ikhana basic crew consists of a rated pilot to control the aircraft and command the mission, and enlisted aircrew member to operate sensors and weapons as well as a mission coordinator, when required. These operators enroll in a six month basic training course provided by the U.S. Air Force that mirrors traditional Undergraduate Pilot Training, but has some differences specific to the Ikhana (Ika, 2012).  Additionally, General Atomics has a Predator Mission Aircrew Training System (PMATS) which is a highly sophisticated flight simulator that accurately reproduces the Ikhana’s GCS (General Atomics, n.d.).  On the other hand, Insitu offers many certificate courses in order to train individuals to the specific airframe and operations pertaining to the ScanEagle.  Insitu offers a ten week operator course, a five week maintainer course, and additional courses in: mission coordination, UAS familiarization, system upgrades, and new technologies (Insitu, n.d.).  Insitu’s courses are Department of Defense certified, MIL-PRF-29612B compliant, and SCORM conformant (Insitu, n.d.).  Neither of the courses for the Ikhana or ScanEagle requires any previous manned or unmanned flight experience, however prior knowledge/experience is desired.

        A minimum and ideal set of criteria that can be used to identify the most highly qualified applicants for these positions to ensure compliance with all applicable rules and regulations is to have a certificate of completion from either of the previously mentioned courses.  While previous UAS experience or manned aircraft experience is desired, the classes tailored specifically to the aircrafts that are intended to be used for this mission would be optimal.  By owning one of these aircraft, the company should have a relationship strong enough with Insitu and General Atomics to get recommendations of operators based upon their classes.  Additionally, the company could inquire about using their simulators in order for prospective operators to showcase their abilities.

References

General Atomics. (n.d.). Predator Mission Aircrew Training System. RetrievedJuly 22, 2014, from ga-asi.com: http://www.ga-asi.com/products/training_support/pmats.php

Ika, S. (2012, August 20). 18X pilots graduate from AF’s first MQ-9 Basic Course. Retrieved July 22, 2014, from holloman.af.mil:http://www.holloman.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123314840

Insitu. (n.d.). ScanEagle. Retrieved July 22, 2014, from insitu.com:http://www.insitu.com/systems/scaneagle

Insitu. (n.d.). Training. Retrieved July 22, 2014, from insitu.com:http://www.insitu.com/services/training

Pappalardo. (2007, August). Flocking ScanEagles. Retrieved July 22, 2014, from Air and Space Magazine: http://www.airspacemag.com/military-aviation/flocking-scaneagles-20369494/

USAF. (2010, August 18). MQ-9 Reaper. Retrieved July 22, 2014, from af.mil:http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104470/mq-9-reaper.aspx

Operational Risk Management

      The rapidly advancing technology in the aviation field creates many challenges in maintaining a safe industry.  While the manned aviation requirements are strict, the unmanned requirements will be even stricter (once the requirements are set by the FAA).  Without the human presence on board, safety is completely reliant on the continuity of the electronics both on board the aircraft and with the operator.  One way to assess the risks associated with operating a UAV is to create an Operational Risk Management Assessment Tool.  While most hazard and risk analyses are generally used throughout all stages of a products’ life cycle; this paper will focus on the operational phase of a small commercial UAS, a DJI Phantom.

            In order to create an ORM Assessment Tool, a few steps must be taken in order to develop the tool.  The first step is a Preliminary Hazard List (PHL), a brainstorming tool used to identify initial safety issues early in the UAS operation (Barnhart, Hottman, Marshall, & Shappee, 2011).  This list is broken down into stages of the flight: planning, staging, launching, flight, and recovery (Barnhart, Hottman, Marshall, & Shappee, 2011).  Typically, each stage of flight has its own PHL sheet in order to reduce confusion.  Once the hazards for each stage are listed, one needs to determine the probability and severity of the hazard using the levels defined in MIL-STD-882D/E.  Per the MIL-STD-882D/E the levels of probability are: frequent, probable, occasional, remote, or improbable; and the levels of severity are: catastrophic, critical, marginal, or negligible (Barnhart, Hottman, Marshall, & Shappee, 2011).  Then the risk level needs to be determined.  This is usually done with a numeric value in order to obtain a sum of the values and get a total risk assessment number; when following the MIL-STD-882D/E the lower the number, the higher the risk.  Once the initial risk levels have been identified, an analysis needs to be done to find ways to mitigate the listed hazards (Barnhart, Hottman, Marshall, & Shappee, 2011).  In order to demonstrate this, an example of a PHL/A is given for the Staging stage (see figure 1). 

Figure 1 – Example of Preliminary Hazard List/Analysis

PRELIMINARY HAZARD LIST/ANALYSIS (PHL/A)
DATE:  17 Jul 2014		PREPARED BY:   Derek Iannuzzi			PAGE  2   OF   5
Operational Stage:         [ ] Planning          [X] Staging          [ ] Launch          [ ] Flight          [ ] Recovery
TRACK #	HAZARD	PROBABILITY	SEVERITY	RL	MITIGATING ACTION	RRL	NOTES
1	Nearby terrain features	Probable	Marginal	9	Change location or procedures	14
2	Nearby people	Occasional	Critical	6	Clear the area	22
3	GPS connectivity issues	Remote	Negligible	19	Change location to acquire more GPS satellites	20
4	Equipment calibration issues	Remote	Negligible	19	Calibrate UAS	24
5	Proximity to nearby airport	Improbable	Critical	15	Contact ATC	15
6	Potential for mid-air collision	Improbable	Catastrophic	12	Change flying procedures	12
7	Ability to maintain LOS	Remote	Marginal	14	Change GCS position	23
8	Improper "home" location	Remote	Negligible	19	Change location	24
RL = Risk Level, RRL = Residual Risk Level		Probability, Severity, and Risk Levels defined in MIL-STD-882D/E

Figure 1. An example of a Preliminary Hazard List/Analysis for sUAS operations in regards to a DJI Phantom during the Staging phase.  Adapted from: Barnhart, R., Hottman, S., Marshall, D., & Shappee, E. (2011). Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems. London: CRC Press. page 125.

            The next step is to develop an Operational Hazard Review and Analysis (OHR&A).  Just as the PHL/A tool is used to identify initial safety issues early in the UAS operation, the operational hazard review and analysis is used to identify and evaluate hazards throughout the entire operation and its stages (Barnhart, Hottman, Marshall, & Shappee, 2011).  While most of the hazards in the PHL/A will be redundant in the OHR&A, the latter is more geared towards the area of human factors.  In this assessment, the hazard column is replaced with an action review column.  This column will list if the identified mitigating actions implemented from the PHL/A was adequate (Barnhart, Hottman, Marshall, & Shappee, 2011).  An example of this analysis that continues from the previous PHL/A is demonstrated next (see figure 2).

Figure 2 – Example of Operational Hazard Review and Analysis

OPERATIONAL HAZARD REVIEW AND ANALYSIS (OHR&A)
DATE:  17 Jul 2014			PREPARED BY:   Derek Iannuzzi			PAGE  2   OF   5
Operational Stage:         [ ] Planning          [X] Staging          [ ] Launch          [ ] Flight          [ ] Recovery
TRACK #	ACTION REVIEW	PROBABILITY		SEVERITY	RL		MITIGATING ACTION	RRL	NOTES
1	Change location or procedures	Remote		Marginal	14		Review of new procedures	17
3	Change location to acquire more GPS satellites	Improbable		Negligible	20		Known "good" GPS acquisition locations	24
5	Contact ATC	Improbable		Critical	15		Move location away from airport proximity	22
6	Change flying procedures	Improbable		Catastrophic	12		Restrict flying to LOS	21
RL = Risk Level, RRL = Residual Risk Level		Probability, Severity, and Risk Levels defined in MIL-STD-882D/E

Figure 2. An example of a Operational Hazard Review and Analysis for sUAS operations in regards to a DJI Phantom during the Staging phase.  Adapted from: Barnhart, R., Hottman, S., Marshall, D., & Shappee, E. (2011). Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems. London: CRC Press. page 127.

            Finally, a Risk Assessment can be developed using the PHL/A and OHR&A worksheets.  The risk assessment provides the UAS operator with a quick look at the operation before committing to the flight activity; and it allows safety and management of real-time information needed to continually monitor the overall safety of the operation (Barnhart, Hottman, Marshall, & Shappee, 2011).  This assessment provides a quick check list in order to assess the risks associated with the operation in an easy to read form.  Unlike the previous assessment worksheets, this assessments numerical value is reversed; the lower the number, the lower the risk.  An example of a Risk Assessment for a sUAS operation of a DJI Phantom is given below (see figure 3).

Figure 3 – Example of a Risk Assessment Worksheet

sUAS Risk Assessment
Date: 17 Jul 2014		Aircraft: DJI Phantom			Serial #: 003
UAS Crew/Station:	_______________/____________           _______________/____________
	_______________/____________           _______________/____________
Mission Type	SUPPORT	TRAINING	PAYLOAD CHECK	EXPERIMENTAL
	1	2	3	4
Hardware Changes	NO			YES
	1			4
Software Changes/Calibration	NO			YES
	1			4
Airspace of Operation	WIDE OPEN	MINIMAL HAZ	MODERATE HAZ	ABUNDANT HAZ
	1	2	3	4
Operator Experience with this Aircraft	EXPERT	ADVANCED	INTERMEDIATE	NOVICE
	1	2	3	4
Flight Time	DAY			NIGHT
	1			4
Type of Flight	LOS	LOS/BLOS	BLOS	FPV
	1	2	3	4
Visibility	> 10 MILES	6-9 MILES	2-5 MILES	< 2 MILES
	1	2	3	4
Surface Winds		0-5 KTS	5-15 KTS	> 15 KTS
		2	3	4
Forecast Winds		0-5 KTS	5-15 KTS	> 15 KTS
		2	3	4
Weather Deteriorating	NO			YES
	1			4
Other Airspace Activity	NO			YES
	1			4
Established Lost Link Procedures	YES			NO
	1			NO FLIGHT
GPS Satellites Acquired	ALL 3	2	1	NONE
	1	2	3	4
Proper "home" Location Set	YES			NO
	1			4
Potential For Tx/Rx Interference	NONE	SOME	MODERATE	SEVERE
	1	2	NO FLIGHT	NO FLIGHT
Total
	RISK LEVEL
	18-27	28-36	37-45	45-56
	LOW	MEDIUM	SERIOUS	HIGH
Aircraft Number: __________________       Aircraft Type:  _______________________
Flight Released By:  _____________________________  Date: ____________  Time: ____________

Figure 3. An example of a Risk Assessment worksheet for sUAS operations in regards to a DJI Phantom.  Adapted from: Barnhart, R., Hottman, S., Marshall, D., & Shappee, E. (2011).Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems. London: CRC Press. page 128.

References

Barnhart, R., Hottman, S., Marshall, D., & Shappee, E. (2011). Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems. London: CRC Press.